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Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism. 
Deng Xiaoping, Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics  
 
Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China is often cited as an unprecedented success story as far as 
rural poverty is concerned. Despite recent reports of sometimes violent protests in rural areas 
over illicit land seizures and pollution, since implementing reforms in 1978, China has seen rural 
poverty rates fall from xxx to yyy, as economic growth increased zzz on average each year, 
according to World Bank estimates. Some have ascribed liberal policy prescriptions based on 
open markets and pro-market government policies as are largely responsible, even as they 
forwent expensive, large-scale mass welfare programs. Starting with their initial round of 
fundamental reform of China’s land policy, based since the mid-1960s on collective agriculture 
and an all-encompassing communal system, China’s leadership enhanced the role of the market 
in order to spur agriculture production and growth in China’s economy. They accomplished this 
through market reforms centered on a “Household Responsibility System,” under which local 
governments reallocated land to China’s peasant families through long-term leases, allowing 
them to sell agriculture production over set quotas on a free market based on gradually reformed 
prices. This reform, completed over the next few years, not only dramatically increased rural 
incomes, reducing poverty in many rural areas, but also helped to jump start China’s economy by   2 
providing additional incentives – in the form of more plentiful food – to urban workers. This, 
combined with subsequent primarily urban-based reforms, though gradual, spurred development 
that fueled China’s impressive economic growth that produced history’s most dramatic reduction 
of rural poverty. 
While the record of poverty reduction is indeed impressive, two other elements of the above 
argument concerning the process through which poverty reduction occurred are more 
controversial. First, advocates of this argument emphasize the close and crucial role that 
economic growth played in reducing rural poverty. Economic growth provided new opportunities 
for farmers, stimulated markets for agriculture products, filled government coffers used to fund 
infrastructure and other projects, and sparked industrialization which provided new job 
opportunities for migrants. This is a commonly-held view. For instance, the World Bank, in a 
comprehensive survey of rural poverty in China during the 1980s and 90s, found that for each 
one point of GDP growth in China, rural poverty declined 0.8 percent. Scott Roselle and his 
colleagues similarly found a .98 correlation between economic growth and poverty reduction in 
the country. In emphasizing the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction, this 
research echoes a common theoretical hypothesis linking growth with poverty (e.g., Dollar and 
Kraay 2002). A conclusion limited to the linkage between economic growth and poverty 
reduction, however, would not be controversial, for most theories of development and poverty 
reduction – from Smith to Marx – emphasize growth and industrialization. However, observing 
this link leaves unexplored the mechanisms through which economic growth was achieved, as 
well as how it reduced poverty. On this question, many analysts posit a second argument, 
contending that market-oriented liberalization sparked both economic growth and, both directly 
indirectly (through economic growth), helped to reduce poverty. Though gradual, the reforms,   3 
because market-based, allowed China’s farmers the freedom needed to profit from individual 
initiative, motivating farmers to farm more actively, to make better decisions on planting and to 
seek to learn how to make farming more effective. Responding to higher market prices, and 
allowed for the first time in decades to keep the rewards for their own labor, most farmers 
increased their workload, reallocated labor within the household and made crucial investments in 
the land. A reduction in state interference provided freedom for peasants to choose among more 
alternatives, not only within farming itself, but outside agriculture. 
Among those arguing for the linkage between a reduction in state ‘interference’ and 
subsequent economic growth and poverty reduction, sociologist Victor Nee is typical, writing,  
The role of markets in China has steadily increased since 1978 and the 
agricultural sector has undergone the most dramatic shift in reliance on market 
coordination. In 1980, the state instituted the household responsibility system 
which is in many ways similar to private farming in a market economy, with the 
household leasing its land and paying delivery quota as rent… This change in 
ownership structure returned to peasants incentives in line with their traditional 
preferences for household production and eliminated the ‘free rider dilemma’ that 
had plagued collectivist agriculture. This shift resulted in dramatic increases in 
per capita income in the 1980s … The correlation between increases in per capita 
income and the transition from redistributive/collective agriculture to household 
commodity production is striking. (Nee 1989, p. 664) 
Many prominent China experts share Victor Nee’s view, including political economist Dwight 
Perkins (1991) and political scientist Kate Zhou (1996). These arguments present China as a 
major – because it is a large and reforming communist state – example supporting the ‘pro-
market’ side of the debate on whether state or market forces are superior for reducing poverty 
(e.g., Kohli 2002, Kanbur 2001).  
This article tries to balance this view, arguing that the actual story is less straightforward. In 
this article, I first trace the explanatory power of economic growth, comparing it to patterns of 
poverty reduction. While economic growth certainly played no small role in many periods during 
the reform era (1978-present), during other periods, the linkage between economic growth and   4 
poverty reduction appears to be less direct, as poverty rates responded to forces (often policy) 
other than economic growth. Second, I focus on the initial reform period to the mid-1980s, 
especially the Household Responsibility System to examine the assumption that it was primarily 
market-based. While the state did apply market forces to enhance incentives for China’s farmers 
by providing tangible rewards for household effort, the role of the state in setting high quota 
prices, providing important agriculture inputs and improving infrastructure, also played a crucial 
role. The opportunities to access the market under the household responsibility system proved 
critical in helping farmers emerge from poverty by the mid-1980s. However, by that time, the 
pace of poverty reduction slowed, and in some areas reversed for a time, despite a continuously 
growing economy. Only when the state increased quota prices to encourage more grain growing 
did agricultural production rise again. In the third section, I outline the programs and policies 
that have made a difference in reducing rural poverty in China, including examples of central, 
provincial and local initiatives that were indispensable to that effort.  As early as 1986, the state, 
hoping to maintain the pace of poverty reduction, asserted itself more fully in the poverty 
reduction effort, not only in building roads and bridges, establishing and regulating markets in 
towns and villages, and promoting opportunities for rural non-skilled and semi-skilled workers in 
manufacturing, mining and services, but also through larger projects and proactive central and 
local initiatives for rural development. In sum, in contrast to a view of economic growth and 
market forces as the major impetus behind the impressive rate of poverty reduction in China and 
the view of the state as an often predatory actor impeding poverty reduction, the role of the state 
in poverty reduction was of critical importance, even as the role of economic growth – though 
important – is more circumscribed.   5 
Section 1: Trends in Poverty Reduction in China 
Poverty declined radically in China since Deng Xiaoping took the helm in 1978 (Figure 1). 
Various scholars have attempted to measure China’s poverty by applying a variety of poverty 
standards, including the international poverty line of US$1/person/day, China’s poverty line, or 
some other cut-off line. Despite the 
differing results, each of these 
studies concludes that, overall, 
China’s poverty rate has declined 
rapidly since 1978. A cursory 
comparison of China’s declining 
poverty rates with the country’s 
rising gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita (Figure 2) 
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China's Official Poverty Line (World Bank 1992, 2001; Rozelle, et al,
2000; Park Wang 2001)
Poverty Line Calculated by World Bank (Ravallion Chen 2004)
Figure 1: Poverty headcount rate in China. Sources: World Bank 1992, 
2001, Rozelle 2001, Park Wang 2001, Ravallion Chen 2004 
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Figure 2: China's GDP/capita. Source: World 
Development Indicators   6 
suggests that China’s poverty is 
closely and inversely linked with 
China’s growth. However, careful 
scrutiny of the data reveals two 
trends that cast doubt on the direct 
link between growth and poverty. 
First, examining poverty rates 
reveals not uniform decline, but 
several time periods with 
contrasting trends. Based on nearly any measure, China’s headcount poverty rate declined most 
rapidly from 1978 to 1984, from 260 million to 128 million people according to China’s official 
statistics, before flattening out between 1984 and 1989, when the official statistics place the 
poverty headcount rate at 106 million. In the 1990s, poverty rates declined steadily once again, 
especially after 1993.
1 Thus, though China’s poverty rate declined between 1978 and the present, 
it did so more rapidly in some periods and less rapidly in others. Second, economic growth 
benefited some socioeconomic groupings more than it did others, as evidenced by China’s 
precipitously expanding rich-poor gap (Figure 3), although again, in different patterns during 
different periods. This is true not only in China as a whole, but also in China’s rural areas. 
Starting from a low level in 1980 of .25, the Gini index (a commonly-used measure of 
                                                      
1 After comparing several Western and Chinese measures of China’s poverty rate over time, two 
economists conclude, “All estimates agree that there was a spectacular reduction in poverty in 
the early 1980s. All estimates other than the official poverty count show little or no progress in 
poverty reduction in the late 1980s. Reductions in the official count are almost certainly due to 
insufficient inflation of the poverty line in 1988 and 1989. In the early 1990s, Khan and the 
World Bank show little decline until after 1993. The official poverty count falls steadily 
throughout the 1990s,” (Park and Wang 2001). 
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Figure 3: China's rural and national Gini index. Source: 
Ravallion and Chen 2005   7 
inequality) for China’s rural areas 
declined slightly to .24 in 1982, 
but then increased steadily to 
reach .34 in 1993, when it 
apparently leveled off, a pattern 
similar for China’s overall Gini 
index (Ravallion and Chen 2004, 
p. 39). 
Looking more carefully at 
economic growth and poverty reduction underscores were not linked in many periods. 
Comparing all four indicators in Figures 1 through 4 (poverty rates, GDP, the rich-poor gap and 
growth rates in GDP/Capita), whereas poverty reduction slowed and the rich-poor gap increased 
starting in 1984, the rate of GDP growth that had begun in 1978 accelerated in 1982, reaching its 
height in 1984 and 1985, when GDP per capita grew 13.2 and 12.1 percent, respectively. The 
economic growth experienced during this period (1983-1985) primarily benefited wealthier 
people, as the slowing rate of poverty reduction and increasing rich-poor gap indicate. Moreover, 
as poverty began to decline again in the early 1990s (especially 1993), the rate of increase for per 
capita GDP had already slowed. Thus while it is true that growth consistently expanded and 
poverty consistently declined during most periods between 1978 and the present, neither are the 
two factors as systematically related as some argue, but also economic growth does not appear to 
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Figure 4: GDP/capita rate of increase. Source: Author's 
calculations   8 
have helped the poor of China as much as it did everyone else.
2 Other factors, in addition to 
growth, must have been at work. 
Section 2: The State and the Household Responsibility System 
One time period in which the growth and poverty rates do vary together is 1978-1984. 
During the entire nearly thirty-year-long reform period, the breakup of the communes and the 
decollectivization of farms was the one change in government policy with the most extensive 
impact on the lives and livelihoods of farmers, both poor and non-poor. Between 1979 and 1984, 
the Chinese government, which was under some political pressure from farmers and local 
governments, gradually but steadily broke up the old communal system that has been in place 
since the 1950s, divided the land relatively equitably among rural residents, and signed long-
term leases with them.
3 For the first time in decades, the government devolved planting and other 
major decisions to the most local of units, the household (Chung 2000, Zweig 1997). However, 
although market forces and market-set prices increase in importance, even as the role of the state 
in making micro-level planting and distribution decisions waned, the role of the state was far 
greater than that prescribed by liberal economists. Under this system, the government assigned 
each family responsibility for producing government-established quotas, which the state then 
                                                      
2 Throughout the 1990s, the rich and poor gained from growth at different rates. As one World 
Bank report concludes, the income of China’s richest one percent grew four times as fast as 
everyone else’s; the income of the richest 20 percent increased by 6.9 percent per year, while the 
income of the bottom half grew at 4.9 percent each year (Chen and Wang 2001). 
3 Studies independently undertaken by Unger (2002a) and Cheng (1998) confirm that plot size or 
quality distributed to local officials did not significantly differ from the average, indicating a 
relatively equitable distribution process. However, Cheng finds that officials command greater 
access to agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, which affects their income.   9 
purchased at set prices that increased steadily over the first few years.
4 The government also 
allowed any production above the quotas to be sold on the newly reopened private markets.  
The change was extraordinary. In 1978, nearly all planting decisions were made by 
commune authorities. By 1984, 96 percent of all farms were held by private producers. The 
number of agricultural products subject to government procurement declined from 113 in 1978 
to 38 by 1984, although procurement of major products such as grain continued (Fan, et al. 2002, 
p. 53). With the combination of newly endowed rights to land, individual incentives linking work 
to reward, increases in government procurement prices and good weather, agricultural 
production rose 6.6 percent on average each year between 1978 and 1984 (Yao 1999). Farmers, 
no longer obligated to produce grain first, reverted to producing traditional and more profitable 
crops, such as cotton in Shandong. While some bemoaned the reduction in scale of Chinese 
farms (e.g., Hinton 1991), the stimulus to the agricultural sector was such that it grew faster than 
the industrial sector and narrowed for a time the urban-rural rich-poor gap (Whyte 1986, pp. 113-
4), reducing poverty quickly in many areas of the country. By the mid-1980s, the government 
was faced with unmanageably ballooning costs. As a result, the central government slashed 
agricultural procurement prices paid for grain and other agricultural goods over the years of the 
mid-1980s and early 1990s, while simultaneously phasing out grain subsidies in urban areas, 
primary factors behind the decline in grain production from 1984 until the early 1990s. These 
declines sparked the government to reverse course and increase procurement prices several 
times: by 40 percent in 1994 (when procurement prices exceeded international prices) and 42 
percent in 1995 (Fan, et al. 2002)(Findlay 1997). 
                                                      
4 In 1979 alone, procurement prices for above-quota sales on 18 agricultural products increased 
50 percent.   10 
Therefore, though the agricultural reforms were based on increasing the range of market 
choices for peasants, enhancing the efficient selection of agriculture production and allocation of 
key inputs, the government role was also significant, a critical determinant of the subsequent 
levels of grain production. Most advocates of pro-market reforms willingly concede the 
importance of government involvement in establishing institutions and enforcing laws. In this 
case, the implementation of the household responsibility system for agriculture in China placed 
heavy demand on local governments for reasonably fair reallocation of collectively owned land 
to households, including the resolution of disputes. Central governments had extensive work in 
ensuring compliance with the policy and ensuring its systematic implementation in all parts of 
the country. However, the importance of the state went far beyond the implementation and 
enforcement of a fundamentally pro-market policy. Indeed, grain production during this time 
period closely followed the levels of pricing the government established for quotas of agriculture 
produce, with higher prices producing higher grain yields.  When the government’s procurement 
price increased, as during the 1978-1984 period, the lot of farmers improved, but when 
procurement prices were cut, poverty reduction stagnated or even reversed itself. While Perkins 
(1991) and Lardy (1983) specifically deny a place for procurement prices in explaining rising 
farm incomes, research by Claude Aubert (1990), Albert Park and his co-authors (1994) and 
(even while recommending scrapping agricultural quotas) Terry Sicular (1995), each find the 
state’s quotas and procurement system during the 1978-1984 period to be progressive on 
incomes.
5 Moreover, the costs of this program were significant, and could rival many costly 
                                                      
5 Perkins, in writing about China’s rural economy of the early 1980s, discusses the role of state 
subsidies for grain prices. However, he argues that the market was the primary driver behind 
rural growth, but notes directly afterwards the problem of massive state deficits that accumulated 
as prices paid by the state to farmers exceeded those paid to the state by urban residents. He   11 
direct benefits programs. Thus, the role of the state – a far more proactive state than most pro-
market theorists would advocate – was important to understanding the extent of poverty 
reduction in China.  
 
Section 3: Government Responses after Reform (1978-2005) 
Finally, in addition to the effect of growth on poverty, we should also consider government 
policy changes implemented during different time periods. To underscore the primary role 
played by the state in reducing poverty, this necessarily brief survey mainly highlights some of 
the key poverty-reduction policies implemented during the post-1976 reform era. When Perkins 
(1991), among others, asserts that no formal rural anti-poverty programs were established before 
the mid-1980s, he is no doubt referring accurately to the relative absence of direct development 
programs in poor areas. This gives the incorrect impression that rural reform was the sole driver 
of poverty reduction during this period. As the government implemented the Household 
Responsibility System, China’s anti-poverty policies were not nearly as extensive as those 
adopted later. Nevertheless, the government responded directly to rural poverty during these 
years in a number of ways, both old and new. Since the mid-1950s the government had been 
implementing rural relief programs to guarantee subsistence in-kind income to destitute 
residents, even though responsibility for that task was borne, in order, by the family, the 
workplace and the state. For households with the “three lacks” (those families that lack financial 
support, a source of livelihood and labor power), China’s central government had by the 1956 
adopted Model Regulations for Advanced Agriculture Producers’ Cooperatives, a program of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
apparently does not give any credit for rural poverty reduction to an expensive, government-
managed system that created incentives for farmers to grow and sell grain and for urban residents 
to purchase more grain surpluses than they otherwise could afford (Perkins 2001, pp. 526-7).   12 
“five guarantees” of vital goods and services: food, clothing, burial expenses, children’s 
education and medical care (Dixon 1981). In practice, only the childless elderly (83 percent of 
recipients), orphans and the disabled received these funds, which were usually quite modest, as 
many poor areas were able to provide the needy little more than grain rations (World Bank 
1992).
6 Moreover, the precondition that the state seizure recipient assets provided strong 
disincentives for cheating (Hussain 1990). Nevertheless, for decade, this program this 
represented the primary direct anti-poverty program that specifically targeted the non-working 
poor. In addition to this program, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) also managed programs in 
disaster relief by providing clothing and grain to areas affected by earthquake, floods and 
drought, with the objective of ensuring survival and not necessarily of compensating damages 
(World Bank 1992, p. 109).  
In addition to these programs, central government ministries implemented programs 
specifically targeted to poor areas. The government made nine years of formal education 
compulsory in 1978, an unrealistic ideal that has yet to be made universal throughout China even 
today (Unger 2002a).
7 Nevertheless, according to official statistics, illiteracy rates declined from 
48 percent in the 1970s to less than 10 percent by 1997 (Fan, et al. 2002, pp. 22-3). The Ministry 
of Public Health also implemented programs that focused on improving education and healthcare 
in poor areas, although some argue that these programs only partially compensated for the end of 
the “barefoot doctor” system that provided healthcare to rural areas before 1978 (Piazza and 
                                                      
6 The program’s reach is modest. One 1957 survey found only 12 people in one Shanghai 
commune of 3,432, were receiving “five guarantees” support. Overall, throughout China, less 
than one percent of rural residents were receiving such benefits (Dixon 1981, p. 193). Hussain 
(1990), while critical of the system, notes that three percent of rural residents over 65 receive 
wubao aid, which he calls “exceptional” for a developing country. 
7 For instance, a campaign to wipe out illiteracy and provide nine years of education was being 
implemented in remote rural areas in Guizhou and Yunnan in 2004.   13 
Liang 1998)(Hussain 1990). Moreover, the government focused on electrifying the countryside, 
which increased most rapidly during this period, as well as subsidizing grain to support poor 
rural areas (Fan, et al. 2002)(Park and Rozelle 1994). Finally, in 1982 the State Council 
implemented the Sanxi Agricultural Construction Fund provided development aid grants to 47 
counties in Gansu and Ningxia as part of a special Ministry of Finance (MOF)-administered 
Development Fund for Underdeveloped Areas (Kuchler 1990). 
By the mid-1980s, China’s central government, seeking to deepen its focus on poverty 
reduction, established an extensive array of formal anti-poverty initiatives for poor rural areas. 
This effort required an extensive network of new institutions. In May 1986, the State Council 
established the Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor Areas (LGPAD)
8 to oversee 
and coordinate anti-poverty programs, in part through its executive agency, the Poor Area 
Development Office (PADO), with branches in provinces, prefectures, and counties throughout 
China. In addition, many township-level governments also assigned a point person to work with 
county-led PADOs on poverty reduction (World Bank 2001). That year, the central government 
also designated 331 counties (about 12 percent of the country’s total) as poor based on a poverty 
line of RMB 150 (for most counties), RMB 200 (for selected minority or old revolutionary base 
areas), or RMB 300 (for special cases, including pastoral and semi-pastoral counties).
9 
Supplementing this monetary income standard, the central government also considered those 
counties with per capita grain production under 200 kg per capita as poor counties (World Bank 
1992, p. 117). For designated poor counties, the central government earmarked special funds. 
Provincial governments supplemented this central list with an additional 368 counties based on 
                                                      
8 In 1993, the name of this organization changed to the “Development-Oriented Poverty 
Alleviation Leading Group” (State Council LGPAD 2003). 
9 For much of the 1990s, RMB was trading at approximately 8.2 to the US dollar.   14 
their own poverty lines (Fan, et al. 2002). Therefore, between the national and provincial lists, 
counties designated as poor approached 700, about a quarter of China’s counties, each of which 
received central and local support through three key programs, described below. 
How well did this list actually cover the poor? Most counties included in the initial list were 
indeed poor, living in areas with severe geographic and environmental problems, below average 
levels of irrigation, fertilizer use and poor infrastructure. However, for political reasons, counties 
designated poor on the national level were spread throughout the country, a decision that 
benefited many relatively well-off provinces, while forcing some poorer provinces to add to their 
provincial lists some counties that under objective standards should have qualified for inclusion 
on the national list (Piazza and Liang 1998, p. 264). This problem was partially addressed when 
government officials adjusted county lists in 1993 and 2001. Nevertheless, experts estimate that 
a minority of the people within poor counties were poor (i.e., below China’s poverty line), and 
more than half of China’s poor people lived outside these designated poor areas, scattered among 
China’s other counties (Park, et al. 2002, Riskin and Li 2001). For these reasons, World Bank 
researchers suggest that China shift its focus to townships, one administrative level below the 
counties (World Bank 2001). Many provinces during this period, in search of quick successes, 
directed funding to the wealthier of the poor counties (Park, et al. 2002, p. 134), thereby 
mitigating the overall impact on poverty. 
In spite of these challenges related to targeting and leakage of funds, this program did 
apparently benefit targeted poor counties. One study concluded that economic growth in 
designated counties exceeded growth in non-designated poor counties by 2.3 percent in 1985-
1992 and by 0.9 percent in 1992-1995 (Park, et al. 2002). Another found a 1.1 percentage point 
increase per year in consumption between 1985 and 1990, and a marginal return on investment   15 
of 12 percent for money spent on 
projects in these areas (Jalan and 
Ravallion 1998), while a 
subsequent study found a 12.5 
percent return  for 1985-1992 
compared to 11.6 percent for 
1992-1995 (Park, et al. 2002).  
To support poor counties, the 
central government implemented 
three core poverty-alleviation 
programs, which included 
subsidized loans through the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the 
Food-for-Work program (Yigong-
Daizhen) through the State 
Development Planning 
Commission, and development 
grants through the Ministry of 
Finance (World Bank 2001). 
These programs were funded 
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centrally, with matching funds expected from provincial and local governments. In real terms, 
overall funding levels fell over time, and did not achieve their previous levels until 1996 (Figure 
5).
10 Moreover, the funding levels of these three programs varied a great deal (see Figure 6). 
•  Subsidized loans 
Viewed as the flagship of China’s poverty reduction efforts, China’s subsidized loan 
program was intended to provide inexpensive loans to poor families with which they can invest 
in productive agricultural assets. While program did benefit many Chinese families, it is difficult 
to find an expert with an overall positive evaluation of the program (World Bank 2001). 
Originally oriented toward direct lending for household agricultural production, in 1989 
governments at all levels refocused the program on promoting TVEs, before reverting in 1996 to 
its original focus on households (Rozelle, et al. 2000, p. 10). Surveys do suggest that most loans 
were directed to poor rural households. However, while the program was intended to target 
agricultural production of poor rural households, many loans either subsidized primarily direct, 
unsustainable household consumption or were diverted to middle-income farmers, dampening 
their long-term effect on poverty (Park, et al. 2002). Moreover, some local governments, which 
consider most poor people risky, because they are incapable of managing agriculture projects 
successfully, channeled loans away from them to wealthier people or to businesses. In the late 
1990s, poverty-alleviation loans were systematically diverted to capital-intensive enterprises of 
the kind that hired few poor people (World Bank 2001, pp. 47-8). Though losses to this program 
are difficult to calculate, researchers estimate that total losses from this program are substantial 
                                                      
10 The data for this chart has two sources, one (World Bank 2001) for the years 1986 to 1998, 
and the other (State Council LGPAD 2003) for 2000 to 2002, leaving a gap.    17 
(Rozelle, et al. 2000, pp. 7-8). Still, these have to be weighed against the significant number of 
families that program has been able to pull out of poverty. 
•  Food-for-work 
Much clearly successful is the Food-for-Work program, implemented by the State Planning 
Commission, which was designed to provide rural employment to poor people, hiring them to 
work on labor-intensive projects to promote drinking water, land improvements and local road 
construction. By the early 1990s, the government diversified the program to include water 
conservation, education and health. A World Bank (2001) study concluded that, although many 
poor villages could not participate in Food-for-Work opportunities, the program did 
predominantly reach poor rural residents in those areas in which it was implemented in part 
because remunerations were modest enough to support self-selection. The Food-for-Work 
program is also praised for successfully constructing rural infrastructure, including 131,000 km 
of rural roads and 7,900 bridges, and for providing 20 million people with drinking water 
between 1985 and 1991 (Zhu and Jiang 1996). Thus, the effect of the food-for-work program on 
poverty is two-fold: it provided needed support for the working poor and, through the completed 
projects, provided vital services for poor areas. 
Despite this success, China’s Food-for-Work program faced several problems. Most 
provinces and counties provided insufficient matching funds, often far less than the program 
required. As a result, program officials were sometimes forced to purchase inputs with central 
funds, reducing the amount of funds available to compensate rural labor. Thus, estimated 40 
percent of the participating labor force was obtained for free or on a non-cash basis, as local 
governments in rural areas maintained the “work day contribution system,” a throwback to the 
communal era in which each household was given quotas for labor contributions (World Bank   18 
2001, p. 50). In addition, the program was implemented in a top-down fashion, and community 
needs were sometimes not addressed (for instance, work focused on terracing instead of an 
alternative, expressed community need such as road construction), and some projects (such as 
the construction of rural post offices) had little direct effect on poverty (Zhu and Jiang 1996). 
Finally, the expansion of the program in the mid-1990s made the program more difficult to 
administer and monitor (World Bank 2001, p. 51). Nevertheless, even when rural labor was 
unpaid, many poor rural communities benefited significantly from drinking water and rural 
infrastructure created through this program, and rural families obtained transferable skills. 
•  Development grants  
The development grant program, administered by the Ministry of Finance, is the most poorly 
studied of the three programs, although one report noted that development grants are “highly 
progressive” and have effectively reduced poverty (Park, et al. 2002, p. 139). Nevertheless, the 
value of grant funding has declined in real terms from the late 1980s and did not again reach its 
1986 value until 1998 (World Bank 2001, p. 51).  
By 1993, the central government, facing widening gaps between rich and poor, redoubled its 
efforts, designing the “Seven-Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program” designed to eliminate 
poverty among China’s remaining 80 million poor people (calculated based on China’s poverty 
line) over the subsequent seven years (i.e., by 2000). The plan, nicknamed “8-7” (ba-qi), focused 
on several priorities, including land improvement, strengthening poverty-related institutions, 
establishment of establishing a new monitoring system, improving access to migration 
opportunities, continuing investments in agriculture, TVEs and infrastructure (including roads, 
drinking water and electricity), and increasing investments in human capital, education and 
disaster relief (Piazza and Liang 1998, pp. 262-3, World Bank 2001, p. 41). The plan focused   19 
specifically on the problems facing the agriculture sector in mountainous regions by providing 
land development, small-scale water conservation projects, and improved techniques in food 
production, animal husbandry, forestry as well as raising cash crops (World Bank 2001 p. xxv). 
Poor provinces adopted similar plans for this period. 
The 8-7 Plan (the first sentence of which, “Socialism will abolish poverty,” echoes Deng 
Xiaoping’s quote that begins this paper) supported its ambitious list of priorities with additional 
funding. It was not until the 1996 National Poverty Reduction Conference that that State Council 
significantly increased funding under the 8-7 Plan in an effort to achieve poverty reduction 
targets before the 2000 deadline (World Bank 2001, pp. 41-2). The plan also linked government 
and party organizations with poor areas, charging most such organs with supporting a specific 
poor area by, for example, posting cadres temporarily to the areas to act as advisors and raising 
money from government employees for support and development of those areas. Similarly, 
wealthier provinces and cities were and charged them with supporting an assigned poor province, 
helping to with funds, personnel training, and other forms of assistance. According to 
government statistics, by 2000, the 8-7 Plan involved 138 government units, which posted more 
than 3,000 officials to poor areas and were responsible for some RMB 14.9 billion in funding 
(State Council 2003). The province-to-province linkages also provided financial support, 
estimated at RMB 2.14 billion in in-kind and direct financial support, as well as RMB 28 billion 
in investment.  
In May 2001, after the deadline for the 8-7 Plan had passed, China’s government convened a 
working conference to evaluate program success and develop the next stage in China’s poverty 
reduction efforts, from which emerged the “Outline of China’s Development-oriented Poverty 
Alleviation in Rural Areas (2001-2010).” By the end of 2001, the conference had concluded that   20 
the total number of people living under China’s poverty line – which is far lower than 
international standards – totaled 30 million, or less than three percent of the population. These 
people were characterized as living in inhospitable geographic areas dispersed primarily 
throughout the western provinces, where 61 percent of the poor people remained. The program 
also classified a further 60 million people as “low-income” (under RMB 865 per capita). Three 
main foci for the poverty alleviation effort included ensuring that the remaining poor have 
sufficient food and clothing, improving further the living conditions of poor people who have 
recently emerged from poverty and intensifying infrastructure construction.  
Development of Western China  
Despite the impressive pace of poverty reduction, China’s economic growth during the 
reform period benefited primarily the wealthier and better positioned coastal areas first. This 
result was not unexpected by China’s central leaders: when Deng Xiaoping discussed the reform 
era that he had started decades earlier, he noted that some areas will “get rich first,” but that by 
the turn of the century, the central government would have to ensure that other areas catch up. To 
respond the widening gaps in regional development, China’s central government shifted its focus 
away from wealthier coastal provinces, which had received special policies to attract foreign 
investment, toward China’s western interior, inaugurating in late 1999 and early 2000 the central 
government plan to “Open Up the West.” Although this wide ranging plan involves six goals 
(ensuring equity, attracting foreign investment, constructing infrastructure, promoting 
sustainable development and staving off nationalist sentiments among China’s ethnic minorities), 
the plan is vague and its progress has been mixed. Moreover, the amount of financing for most 
items, save infrastructure development, that is forthcoming from the central government is 
relatively modest. According to scholars, the bulk of support was intended to be sourced from   21 
private and foreign investment, which has so far been limited (Goodman 2004, Holbig 2004). 
The government for its part claims it has invested US$ 72.6 billion in dozens of reforestation, 
infrastructure development and other projects between 2000 to April 2003, with US$16 billion 
invested in 14 new “key projects” in 2003 alone (Ash 2004, pp. 869-70).
11 Despite some obvious 
accomplishments, judging the overall effect of this policy – which has been extended in modified 
form to the industrial rust-belt in Northeastern China – is premature (citation). 
 
Other government poverty reduction initiatives including training and placement of migrant 
workers, supporting rural-based town-and-village enterprises, massive infrastructure construction 
project and so forth. In addition to these centrally-administered projects, China’s provincial and 
local governments have also been active in poverty reduction. Starting in 1984, governments at 
all levels shifted from cautious regulation to active encouragement of TVEs (Fan, et al. 2002). 
Local leaders in China’s coastal and inland provinces, responding to new incentives from a 
reformed economic system, established town-and-village enterprises, local industries. The 
number of TVEs exploded during this period, increasing from 1.4 million firms in 1980 to six 
million firms in 1984 to 12.2 million firms in 1985. Employment in TVEs also rose sharply and 
the number of small family firms, which are best suited to small niche markets in local areas, 
also increased. The role of the local official in these industries was central, with many local 
leaders acting as high-level managers and CEOs of these industries, using their political power to 
obtain key inputs and to protect the nascent industries (Oi 1995). This provided many farmers 
employment opportunities outside the farm providing an essential source of cash income. 
                                                      
11 With rising urban poverty, the program has also been applied to the three northeastern 
provinces in China. With economies based on inefficient heavy industry, industrial restructuring 
have cost many workers in this region their jobs.   22 
Although this was important in reducing poverty with sufficiently favorable conditions for 
developing industries, many areas did not receive much benefit from such enterprises (Byrd and 
Gelb 1990, World Bank 1992, p. 65). For instance, by 1990, TVEs in 120 of China’s poorest 
counties employed only four percent of local rural labor (Piazza and Liang 1998, pp. 257-8).  
In addition to establishing these industries, many local governments also implemented more 
traditional anti-poverty programs. Long before provincial governors were help personally 
responsible for reducing poverty in their constituencies in 1996, every province implemented 
strategies for reducing rural poverty. These have taken a variety of forms, including 
development-based initiatives (such as spurring rural tourism or building roadway), or more 
direct anti-poverty programs, such as microcredit programs. Moreover, many local governments 
have taken innovative steps toward poverty reduction, by taking advantage of local attributes. In 
one dry county of the northwestern province of Gansu province, the government encouraged 
farmers to pave their backyards with cement inlaid with a receptacle that would catch rainwater 
that ran off the farmers’ slanted roofs. This helped farmers address one of their most urgent 
problems – access to sufficient water. The ground of one township in the remote, mountainous 
southwestern province of Guizhou, for instance, is so rocky that most agricultural production is 
not viable. Instead of more traditional anti-poverty programs, encouraged farmers to abandon 
efforts to plant grain, and instead plant grass that can grow between the rocks in the soil. A 
micro-credit program was then instituted under which farmers could buy and raise cattle, which 
fed off the grasses, and complemented this strategy by building a market where cattle could be 
bought and sold. Even as the news is dominated by reports of local abuses from local 
government officials, there are many less-well-known stories of these sorts of programs, –   23 
implemented by a pro-active and sometimes quite innovative government, that have proven 
effective in reducing poverty. 
Naturally, the state often adopts policies that have been detrimental to poverty reduction. 
China’s household registration (hukou) system ties peasants administratively to their home areas, 
restricting their freedom of movement. Although this system has relaxed somewhat in recent 
years, with rural migrants able to obtain work permits and even local experiments allowing more 
rural migrants to obtain urban hukou, this population control policy has impeded the ability of 
some rural residents from benefiting from growth in the coastal areas through voluntary 
migration. Moreover, the tax burden on the peasant remains quite high, with some of the highest 
tax rates throughout the 1990s paid by residents of some of the poorest provinces. Moreover, few 
programs of poverty alleviation have been unqualified successes, as reports of systematic 
diversion of funds for various purposes, ranging from the legitimate to the illegitimate, are not 
uncommon. Nevertheless, the overall role of the government in ensuring poverty reduction has 
been a positive one, with central and local authorities playing a role in reducing rural poverty, 
both in areas where economic growth is rapid, as well as in areas far removed from coastal areas 
that has powered China’s impressive industrialization.  
 
Section 4: Conclusions 
In the reform era, pro-market theorists find much support for their prescriptions for 
development and poverty reduction. Many such theorists argue that the withdrawal of the state 
allowed Chinese farmers to produce crops primarily for their own benefit, making planning 
decisions based not on the mandates of state bureaucrats and party cadres, but on what would 
maximize profits for the farmer and his or her household. China’s GNP per capita between 1978   24 
and 1985 increased more than 70 percent, rural incomes increased, poverty declined, and in 
defiance of Kuznet’s inverted “U,” China’s growth, far from stratifying China, narrowed 
inequality between rich and poor, urban and rural, at least until the mid-1980s (Whyte 1986).  
However, a closer look provides more support for the idea that the role of the state – rather 
than lessening – has instead shifted to other vital roles. First, despite the indispensable role that 
economic growth has played in reducing rural poverty in China, the linkage between such 
growth and poverty reduction is not direct during all periods. Economic growth had to be 
complemented with factors other than growth that reduced poverty. Second, we know from the 
lessons of the state-market debate that simple sentiment in favor of the market misses the critical 
role of the state. In China’s case, “Marketizing the countryside” did not merely involve the total 
withdrawal of the state, but the active contribution of the government at all levels even to set up 
the Household Responsibility System (Chung 2000, Unger 2002a, Zweig 1997). The Household 
Responsibility System, although not formally transferring property rights to the formerly 
collectivized peasantry, nonetheless amounts to comprehensive reform of land ownership since it 
granted the ability of rural households to control their own small plots of land. Whereas other 
reforming states have privatized their land by selling it land to the highest bidder or merely 
handing it off to the wealthy, a strong state was required for China to ensure that land was 
allocated relatively equitably, not based on price or wealth, but on citizenship. Finally, the 
government has implemented numerous anti-poverty programs through an extensive 
administrative network that reaches down to the local areas. True, the main role has shifted from 
one of making most marketing decisions to one that more complementary to market forces. 
Nevertheless, this is a proactive and powerful role nonetheless. As David Goodman argues,  
While two decades of economic reform had certainly seen an emphasis on the 
importance of market forces, this had not been an exclusive demand of the central   25 
leadership ... As with the introduction of economic liberalism in Britain during the 
19th century, a balance has been established between state and market with 
specific roles ascribed to each, rather than the replacement of all state economic 
activity by the market. (Goodman 2004, p. 319) 
Growth in GDP, though not determinative, remained important to reducing poverty. Market 
forces also played a crucial role. Despite their central importance, the most important factor for 
China was the relationship between the state and the market. China’s government supported, 
shaped and influenced market forces as its primary – and overall successful – approach to 
poverty reduction.  
 